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A conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI) or refusal to submit a breath sample results in mandatory driver’s license suspension under New Jersey law. The length of the suspension depends on whether or not the person has any prior convictions. In DWI cases, a person’s blood alcohol content (BAC) can also affect the length of the suspension. The New Jersey Legislature recently passed a bill, S20, which applies to train engineers employed by the New Jersey Transit Corporation, or NJ Transit. Previously, a driver’s license suspension associated with a DWI or refusal case had no effect on transit engineers’ authority to operate trains. One of the sponsors of S20 in the State Senate called this an “outrageous loophole in state law.”

A first-time DWI conviction in New Jersey results in a three-month driver’s license suspension, provided that the defendant’s BAC was less than 0.10 percent. If their BAC was 0.10 percent or higher, the mandatory period of license suspension is at least seven months, up to a maximum of one year. A second DWI conviction results in a two-year suspension, regardless of the defendant’s BAC. For a third or subsequent conviction, the suspension period is ten years.

New Jersey’s implied consent law states that anyone driving on the public roads of this state has consented to providing breath samples to police if they suspect DWI. Refusal to submit a breath sample under these circumstances is itself a motor vehicle offense. The length of the mandatory license suspension is similar to the DWI statute: seven months to one year for a first offense, two years for a second offense, and ten years for a third or subsequent offense. Out-of-state convictions for a similar statute may constitute a prior offense for the purpose of determining the length of the suspension.
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The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits police from detaining a person temporarily, or stopping a vehicle on the road, without reasonable suspicion of some sort of unlawful activity. Courts are obligated to throw out charges originating from a traffic stop, such as driving while intoxicated (DWI), if the stop violated the driver’s constitutional rights. The New Jersey Supreme Court recently considered whether this state’s high-beam statute can justify a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. It ruled in State v. Scriven that the stop was unconstitutional because the officer did not witness an actual violation of the high-beam statute.

The “exclusionary rule” requires courts to suppress evidence obtained by police in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. An officer who initiated a traffic stop must justify the stop based on a suspected traffic offense, such as erratic driving or running a stop sign. Without reasonable suspicion, the state cannot use any evidence obtained as a result of that stop. This might include the officer’s testimony about the driver’s appearance or behavior, field sobriety tests, and Alcotest results.

Although the exclusionary rule is a powerful tool for protecting a defendant’s civil rights when police overstep their authority, courts have identified some exceptions. One of these, the “community care exception,” allows police to search private property without a warrant, as well as possibly detain a person or stop a vehicle, in the course of protecting the public from a hazardous situation. A hypothetical scenario might involve a police officer stopping a vehicle to warn about a hazardous road condition and then arresting the driver based on observations that lead the officer to suspect DWI.

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New Jersey law imposes mandatory minimum sentences for certain offenses. A conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI) in New Jersey can result in a mandatory minimum sentence if a defendant has multiple prior convictions. Mandatory minimum sentences may also apply to criminal offenses related to DWI. The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division recently ruled that a trial court violated state law by pronouncing a sentence that was less than the mandatory minimum. In addition to DWI, the defendant in State v. Locane was convicted of the criminal offenses of second-degree vehicular homicide and third-degree assault by auto. The two criminal offenses carry mandatory minimum sentences.

New Jersey’s DWI statute states that a third or subsequent DWI offense shall result in a 180-day jail sentence, but it allows a judge to lower that sentence by one day for each day a defendant spends in a drug or alcohol treatment program, up to a total of 90 days. Although judges have the discretion to reduce a defendant’s jail time by up to half, a third or subsequent DWI offense effectively has a 90-day mandatory minimum sentence.

If a person operates a vehicle recklessly and causes the death of another person, they could be found guilty of “death by auto,” also known as vehicular homicide. Evidence that a defendant was operating a vehicle while intoxicated, in violation of the state’s DWI law, “give[s] rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly.” Other factors that allow a judge or jury to infer recklessness include 24 consecutive hours without sleep and the use of a cell phone while driving. Vehicular homicide combined with DWI carries a mandatory minimum prison sentence of three years, with no eligibility for parole during that time. The law allows judges some discretion but requires them to explain their reasons for deviating from the minimum.

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America, as the saying goes, is a nation of immigrants, meaning that most Americans living today are descended from people who came here from another country. People still come to New Jersey and elsewhere in the country from all over the world. Traveling or moving to the U.S. usually requires a visa issued by the federal government. Aside from foreign diplomats and consular officials, the laws of the U.S. fully apply to anyone with a visa, and certain legal troubles can have a significant impact on a visa holder’s ability to remain in the U.S. The Department of State (DOS) uses a process known as “prudential visa revocation,” which allows it to revoke a person’s visa if they are arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI). This could apply even if the person is never convicted of DWI.

Visas generally fall into two categories:  immigrant visas and nonimmigrant visas (NIVs). Immigrant visas, commonly known as “green cards,” allow people to become permanent residents and possibly apply for naturalization as U.S. citizens. The government issues NIVs to people to come to the U.S. for a particular purpose, such as a job or school. NIV holders must return home when their visas expire.

Federal immigration law identifies multiple categories of people who are “inadmissible” to the U.S., meaning that the government may not issue them visas. These include a history of prior immigration violations, convictions for certain “aggravated felonies,” national security concerns, and “health-related grounds.” These grounds apply to both immigrant visas and NIVs, but NIVs are generally more susceptible to revocation. The DOS and its consular officers have the authority to revoke a NIV “at any time, in [their] discretion.”

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The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects people “against unreasonable searches and seizures” by police, usually by requiring them to obtain a warrant from a judge before conducting a search of a person or their property. Courts have identified some exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the “automobile exception.” Police can search a vehicle without a warrant if they have “probable cause” to believe a search will turn up evidence of criminal activity. This exception may be important to a driving while intoxicated (DWI) defense, since most cases begin with a traffic stop. A federal appellate court recently considered whether a driver’s residence in a state with legal marijuana gave police probable cause to search his vehicle. The court ruled in Vasquez v. Lewis that the search violated the driver’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Police must have “reasonable suspicion” of a criminal or motor vehicle offense before they may stop a vehicle on the road. This is a lesser standard than “probable cause.” Once police have stopped a vehicle, several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s search warrant requirement come into play. The “plain-view rule” states that police can search or investigate anything that they can see from outside the vehicle. An open alcohol container in a cup holder, for example, could lead to a DWI investigation, even if the officer did not suspect DWI when they initiated the traffic stop.

The automobile exception allows a much more thorough search of a vehicle, but an officer must be able to establish that evidence known to them at the time of the search gave them a good-faith belief that they would find contraband or evidence of a crime. Most exceptions to the search warrant requirement involve areas in which people do not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” or situations in which the risk of losing evidence makes obtaining a warrant impractical. The U.S. Supreme Court has found that both types of exceptions apply to motor vehicles, beginning with Carroll v. United States in 1925. Cars are not as private as homes, the court found, and their mobility presents an inherent risk of losing evidence.

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New Jersey’s law on driving while intoxicated (DWI) prohibits “operat[ing] a motor vehicle while under the influence” of alcohol or drugs, or with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 percent or greater. Courts have addressed multiple challenges to the definition of “operate” under this statute. New Jersey courts have held that the key issue is a defendant’s intent to drive, and the Legislature’s objective of preventing drunk driving requires a broad definition of “operate.” The New Jersey Appellate Division reviewed these issues in a recent decision, State v. Cancelosi, in which a defendant challenged the state’s proof that he “operated” his vehicle.The Appellate Division’s ruling in Cancelosi drew heavily on the Law Division’s ruling affirming the defendant’s conviction. The Law Division judge cited multiple cases addressing the definition of “operating” a vehicle under the DWI statute. Intent to drive is at the center of the “inquiry into operation,” according to several New Jersey Supreme Court rulings. In 1973, State v. Daly held that “evidence of intent to drive or move the vehicle” can prove the “operate” element of the statute. The court held in 1987’s State v. Tischio that “a drunk driver offends the law when he evinces an intent to drive his car.” It also held in that case that “a narrow or literal interpretation would frustrate the fundamental regulatory goals underlying New Jersey’s drunk-driving laws.”

A 1963 New Jersey Supreme Court decision, State v. Sweeney, held that the state does not necessarily have to prove any movement by the vehicle. In that case, police found the defendant in a vehicle on the side of a public road with the engine running. Since then, courts have found that circumstantial evidence is admissible to prove that a defendant “operated” a vehicle. The Appellate Division’s 2005 ruling in State v. Ebert stated that circumstantial evidence may include “observation of the defendant in or out of the vehicle under circumstances indicating that the defendant had been driving while intoxicated.”

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The state has the burden of proving that a defendant is guilty of an alleged criminal or motor vehicle offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The New Jersey court system has rules governing the admissibility of evidence, and a defendant may object to certain evidence for a wide range of reasons. In cases of alleged driving while intoxicated (DWI), defendants often challenge the results from an Alcotest device, which measures a person’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC). The New Jersey Appellate Court recently ruled on a DWI defendant’s challenge to the admission of Alcotest evidence during his trial in State v. Patel. The defendant did not challenge the test itself or the results. Instead, he argued that the state had violated his due process rights by failing to preserve surveillance video footage from within the police station taken at the time of the test.

The use of an Alcotest device by police in DWI investigations is subject to multiple mandatory procedures, many of which were established by the New Jersey Supreme Court in a 2008 decision, State v. Chun. Prior to administering the test, an officer must observe the suspect for a continuous 20-minute period. During that time, the officer must make certain that the suspect does not eat or drink anything, place anything else in their mouth, touch their mouth, or regurgitate anything into their mouth. The defendant in Patel argued that surveillance footage would show that the officer failed to meet this observation requirement.

In evaluating the defendant’s challenge to the Alcotest results, the Appellate Division reviewed case law regarding the state’s duty to preserve evidence and its duty to provide evidence to a defendant. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1963’s Brady v. Maryland that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the state to provide exculpatory evidence in its possession to a criminal defendant. New Jersey has applied the same rule to traffic offenses, including DWI, in cases like 2012’s State v. Carrero. These decisions leave it to the state to determine whether evidence is exculpatory or not. In practice, defendants must often take affirmative steps to identify and request—or demand—such evidence from prosecutors.

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New Jersey’s implied consent law states that a person who operates a motor vehicle on the public streets and highways of this state is deemed to have consented to providing breath samples during investigations of suspected driving while intoxicated (DWI). Prior to collecting a breath sample in this situation, a police officer must read a “Standard Statement” explaining the law and the consequences of refusing to submit a sample. Penalties for refusal can include license suspension, monetary fines, and the use of an ignition interlock device. A defendant appealed his refusal conviction under the “confusion doctrine,” which the New Jersey Supreme Court described in a 1987 decision, State v. Leavitt. The Appellate Division rejected this argument in June 2016 in State v. Byrne, holding that the “confusion doctrine” only applies to refusal cases in very limited circumstances.

Law enforcement officers throughout the country are required to read a list of rights to a person during or shortly after their arrest. The U.S. Supreme Court established this obligation in its 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona. This list of rights, which begins with the familiar phrase “You have the right to remain silent,” is commonly known as “Miranda rights.” The process of reading those rights to someone is sometimes called “Mirandizing” them.

The Standard Statement used in DWI arrests in New Jersey is significantly different from the Miranda statement. While the Miranda statement discusses an individual’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination—i.e., the “right to remain silent”—and the right to representation by an attorney, the Standard Statement says that these rights do not apply with regard to the taking of a breath sample.

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New Jersey’s driving while intoxicated (DWI) law places a great deal of emphasis on a defendant’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC). Police can determine a DWI suspect’s BAC by testing a sample of breath, blood, or urine. Breath testing is the most common method, and New Jersey’s implied consent law makes it a traffic offense to refuse a police officer’s demand for a breath sample. Not everyone is physically capable of providing a sufficient sample, however. The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division recently ruled, in State v. Monaco, that a defendant has the burden of proving that a physical condition prevented them from completing a breath test.

Refusing to submit to breath testing is a traffic offense under New Jersey law, with penalties comparable to a first-time DWI. These can include fines, license suspension, and the use of an ignition interlock device. New Jersey police generally use a breath-testing device known as the Alcotest. Court decisions have established procedures that police must follow prior to and during breath testing, including a 20-minute waiting period during which the DWI suspect cannot touch or place anything in their mouth.

The Alcotest device requires at least 1.5 liters of air, which typically requires a person to exhale forcefully for at least four and a half seconds. Not everyone is capable of providing this much air through sustained exhalation. This was a key issue in the defendant’s appeal in the Monaco case.

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New Jersey’s implied consent law makes it a traffic offense to refuse to submit a breath sample during a driving while intoxicated (DWI) investigation. Because of the wide range of possible consequences for refusal, state law requires police to read a “standard statement” detailing those consequences before requesting a breath sample. Several years ago, the New Jersey Legislature made the use of an ignition interlock device (IID) mandatory for certain DWI and refusal convictions. A DWI defendant recently argued to the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division that her refusal conviction should be thrown out because the standard statement in use at the time did not mention required IID use. The court ruled against the defendant in State v. Monaco but offered an overview of when a defective notification should result in relief for a defendant.

An IID is a device that attaches to a car’s ignition mechanism. In order to start the car, the driver must blow into the device, which measures their blood alcohol concentration (BAC). If the person’s BAC is above a certain amount, the IID prevents the car from starting. An IID must be professionally installed, and the defendant must bear the cost of the device in order to retain their driving privileges. Failing to install an IID as ordered, tampering with an IID, or otherwise circumventing or attempting to circumvent the device is a separate offense.

For a first DWI offense, an IID is required if the defendant’s BAC was 0.15 percent or higher, and it must be used for a period of six months to one year after the end of the license suspension. A conviction for refusal requires an IID installation for the same length of time. A second or subsequent DWI offense requires an IID installation for one to three years after the suspension period ends, regardless of BAC.

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