New Jersey DWI Attorney Blog

The state can offer various forms of evidence to prove that a defendant charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) was in fact impaired by alcohol or drugs, including a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 percent or greater. New Jersey law assists police and prosecutors by making refusal to submit a breath sample for BAC testing a separate offense. In an appeal of a DWI conviction, a defendant raised a question about whether a court can consider evidence related to a refusal charge that resulted in an acquittal. The defendant in State v. Pryslak had been acquitted of refusal, but the Law Division had considered evidence related to that case as “evidence of consciousness of guilt” of the DWI charge.

Even without BAC evidence, prosecutors can establish impairment through other means, such as witness testimony. This often involves having an arresting officer testify about their observations at the time of the arrest or shortly afterwards. If a defendant was driving erratically and exhibited outward signs of intoxication when questioned by an officer, this can serve as evidence of impairment. Since police are trained to identify intoxicated people, courts tend to credit their testimony more than that of other individuals who might have witnessed a person driving or behaving in a way that suggested intoxication.

The offense of refusal to submit to breath testing has different elements and therefore requires different types of evidence. The law allows a municipal judge to convict a defendant of refusal even if they did not outright refuse to provide a breath sample. Police must follow specific procedures, outlined by statute and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Chun. This includes a 20-minute observation period prior to administering a breath test, during which time the defendant cannot place anything in their mouth. Evidence that a defendant refused or intentionally failed to follow police instructions, such as by repeatedly interfering with the observation period or failing to blow into the testing device properly, could serve as evidence of guilt of refusal.

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The legal systems of the U.S., New Jersey, and other states have developed rules and procedures regarding trials. The New Jersey Rules of Evidence (NJRE) establishes standards for the admissibility of various types of evidence, including testimony and documentary evidence, as well as procedures for questioning witnesses at trial. Any party to a case can ask the court to sequester witnesses, meaning that witnesses expected to testify at trial cannot see other witnesses’ testimony or discuss the case with others. The Appellate Division ruled last year on a driving while intoxicated (DWI) defendant’s claim that prosecutors violated a sequestration order in State v. McMahon.

NJRE 615 simply states that any party may request an order for sequestration of witnesses, or that the court can issue such an order on its own motion. This means that witnesses must remain outside of the courtroom during other witnesses’ testimony, and that they cannot discuss their upcoming testimony with other witnesses. Courts may hold witnesses in contempt if they violate a sequestration order. In a 1992 decision, Morton Bldgs. v. Rezultz, the New Jersey Supreme Court described “the purpose of sequestration” as being “to discourage collusion and expose contrived testimony.”

Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence goes into more detail about exceptions to sequestration. A defendant, for example, cannot be sequestered from their own case. Anyone found by the court to be “essential to presenting the party’s claim or defense” also cannot be sequestered. The federal rule is not binding in New Jersey state courts, but it is useful for a general understanding of how the rule works.
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The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees multiple rights in criminal cases. New Jersey does not treat driving while intoxicated (DWI) as a criminal offense, but the courts of this state have extended some of the Sixth Amendment’s protections to DWI cases, including “the right to a speedy and public trial.” A defendant who believes they have been denied this right can challenge the indictment. The U.S. Supreme Court has identified several factors to consider in this sort of challenge, and New Jersey courts have held that the denial of the right to a speedy trial should result in the dismissal of the charges. The Appellate Division reviewed these factors last summer in State v. Kurek, in which a DWI defendant sought the dismissal of a case that lasted almost three years.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1972 ruling in Barker v. Wingo identified four factors that courts should consider regarding the right to a speedy trial:  (1) the length of and (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the circumstances of the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice, if any, to the defendant’s interests as a result of the delay. The court did not specify an amount of time that should be considered reasonable, preferring to allow courts to look at the circumstances of each case. The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated a general principle, in 2013’s State v. Cahill, that a court should consider the remaining Barker factors if the delay lasted more than a year.

Delays that are caused by the prosecution or by the court itself weigh in favor of the defendant, unless the court concludes that “the delays “were reasonably explained and justified.” A “neutral reason for delay such as . . . a heavy caseload” weighs in the defendant’s favor, although not as much as fault on the part of the government. If a court finds that the defendant is responsible for the delay, the defendant’s challenge is not likely to succeed.

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Defendants charged with criminal offenses in New Jersey can raise a variety of defenses. These are specific claims or arguments asserting that, even if the allegations against the defendant are correct, the defendant is not criminally liable. Many defenses are derived from the common law, and the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (CCJ) also defines various defenses. Since driving while intoxicated (DWI) is an offense under the Motor Vehicle Code, rather than the CCJ, courts have addressed whether common-law defenses are available in DWI cases on a case-by-case basis. The insanity defense involves the claim that a defendant was incapable of understanding the wrongful nature of their conduct at the time. A Law Division court considered the question of how this might apply to a DWI case at some length in State v. Inglis in 1997.

Insanity is a common-law affirmative defense in New Jersey. When a defendant raises a defense in a criminal case, the prosecution must rebut the defense as a part of their burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. An affirmative defense, however, partially shifts the burden to the defendant, who must prove the elements of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

New Jersey uses the M’Naghten rule to identify what a defendant raising the insanity defense must prove in court. The rule derives from an 1843 English case in which the defendant killed the British Prime Minister’s secretary, falsely believing that the secretary was involved in a conspiracy against him. Under this rule, everyone is presumed to be sane, unless they can prove that, at the time of the offense, they suffered from a “defect of reason” or “disease of the mind,” which kept them from either “know[ing] the nature and quality of” their actions, or from “know[ing] what [they were] doing was wrong.” This is, by design, a difficult standard of proof.

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