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When police detain and question a person on suspicion of driving while intoxicated (DWI), the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution protect that person’s rights. The Fourteenth Amendment officially extended most of the Bill of Rights to state-level law enforcement, meaning that local police are subject to the same constraints as the federal government. In the context of New Jersey DWI cases, the Fourth Amendment states that police cannot detain someone, such as by pulling over their vehicle, without reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. The Fifth Amendment states that a defendant cannot be forced to testify against themselves, and limits the state’s ability to use certain statements made by defendants against them in court. Exactly when this right against self-incrimination applies has been a matter of ongoing dispute in the courts. The U.S. Supreme Court has made several rulings specifically addressing incriminating statements in DWI cases.

The landmark U.S. Supreme Court case addressing the right against self-incrimination during police interrogation is Miranda v. Arizona, decided in 1966. Information obtained by police from a person, after they have invoked their “right to remain silent” during “custodial interrogation,” is inadmissible in court. While people can refuse to answer police questions at almost any time, Miranda obligates police to advise people of their rights in specific scenarios. Many subsequent court decisions have found that Miranda only applies once a person has been formally placed under arrest and read this list of rights. Whether a person is “under arrest” during a traffic stop is a complicated question.

Police do not typically give Miranda warnings to DWI suspects at the beginning of a traffic stop. Still, officers may ask questions of a driver, and ask the driver to perform field sobriety tests. With some exceptions, courts do not consider this to be a “custodial interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda. Police are therefore not obligated to advise people of their Miranda rights at this point, placing the burden of invoking the right against self-incrimination on the driver.
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New Jersey law regarding driving while intoxicated (DWI) imposes progressively harsher penalties for multiple convictions. A defendant might not face heightened penalties, however, through “step-down” provisions in New Jersey statutes and caselaw. If enough time passes between convictions, a second offense might be treated as a first offense for sentencing purposes. A step-down might also apply in other situations, such as if a prior conviction involved a guilty plea without representation by an attorney. Convictions that have been modified through the post-conviction relief (PCR) process may also be subject to a step-down. Courts must weigh a wide range of factors in determining how to sentence a second, third, or subsequent conviction. The Appellate Division took on several of these factors in a recent decision, State v. Terpstra.

The New Jersey DWI statute imposes increasingly harsh sentences for second DWI offenses and third or subsequent offenses. The statute directs courts to treat a second conviction as a first conviction, for the purposes of sentencing, if the first offense occurred over a decade before the second. Likewise, if a third offense occurs more than 10 years after the second, the court shall sentence it as a second offense. The relevant date is when the offenses occurred, rather than the convictions.

Representation by counsel in prior DWI cases may also affect whether the step-down provisions apply. In 1990, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an important ruling, State v. Laurick. The court held that courts may not impose sentencing enhancements if a prior conviction involved a non-counseled guilty plea. In other words, a second DWI conviction must be treated as a first at sentencing if the defendant pleaded guilty in the first case without a lawyer. A third offense would be sentenced as a second.

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The legal standards in New Jersey for proving impairment by alcohol in cases of alleged driving while intoxicated (DWI) are fairly well established. Prosecutors can offer evidence of a defendant’s alleged blood alcohol content (BAC), or they can introduce eyewitness and expert testimony. The DWI statute does not only apply to alcohol, however. It also makes it an offense to drive while “under the influence of…[a] narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug.” New Jersey has no equivalent to the BAC limit of 0.08 percent for drugs. A handful of states have established “legal limits” for certain drugs, but no consistent standards exist. Furthermore, breath testing cannot establish the amount of any particular drug in a person’s system, meaning that the state must rely on blood and urine testing. As legal marijuana becomes more prevalent in various parts of the country, these inconsistencies are likely to become clearer.

Under New Jersey law, a driver commits a DWI offense if they operate a vehicle with a BAC of at least 0.08 percent. This is sometimes known as DWI per se, since the state can meet its burden of proof based solely on BAC evidence and evidence that the defendant actually was driving or imminently intended to drive. Prosecutors can also establish guilt without BAC evidence—or occasionally with test results showing a BAC of less than 0.08 percent—through testimony and other evidence. This often includes testimony from police officers who observed a defendant’s demeanor and appearance, particularly if the defendant was driving erratically, had slurred speech, or otherwise displayed outward signs of intoxication by alcohol.

The DWI statute does not mention any specific drug other than alcohol, but courts have interpreted it to mean both illegal drugs and legal drugs that can affect a person’s ability to drive or operate machinery. They have held that eyewitness and expert testimony is sufficient to prove impairment by drugs. In 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court held in State v. Tamburro that the state must offer evidence that a defendant’s “conduct, physical and mental condition and the symptoms displayed” are consistent with the effects of a narcotic. If the state meets this burden, the court held, it does not have to identify any specific narcotic. The court held in 2006’s State v. Bealor that, unlike in cases involving alcohol intoxication, lay testimony alone is not sufficient to establish impairment by marijuana or other drugs. Police officers with proper training, according to the court, may offer expert testimony.

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Driving while intoxicated (DWI) can affect a person’s life in nearly countless ways. Many potential consequences are not contained in the DWI statute itself. A recent decision by the New Jersey Appellate Division, N.J. Div. of Child Protection and Permanency v. T.S., demonstrates how a DWI case, even when it doesn’t result in a conviction, can have far-reaching consequences—in this case, charges of child endangerment.

New Jersey defines DWI in simple terms. A person commits an offense when they drive while “under the influence” of drugs or alcohol, or when they drive with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 percent or higher. The statute focuses solely on the act of driving and the fact of “influence” by drugs or alcohol. A person’s ability to drive safely, even after a few drinks, is therefore not a factor under New Jersey law. While public safety is one of the central purposes of the DWI statute, the state is not required to prove that a defendant actually posed a direct danger to anyone.

Other areas of law are also concerned with the danger posed by certain activities. New Jersey law defines child abuse or neglect, in part, as “unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof.” In other words, behavior that poses a substantial risk of harm to a child could legally constitute child abuse or neglect, even if the child in question suffered no actual harm. This definition of child abuse or neglect applies to civil proceedings regarding child welfare, including the removal of a child from the home on a temporary or permanent basis. Unlike DWI proceedings, civil cases only require proof by a preponderance of evidence, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.

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A conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI) typically results in a fine, a period of driver’s license suspension, and possibly jail time. Many states’ DWI laws also require the installation of an ignition interlock device (IID) as a condition of driver’s license reinstatement. A driver with an IID must submit a breath sample to the device, which will prevent the engine from starting if the sample shows blood alcohol content (BAC) above a certain level. Courts have the option of ordering an IID in some New Jersey DWI cases, but it is mandatory in other cases. Lawsuits filed around the country have challenged the legality and constitutionality of IID requirements, with varying degrees of success. While none of these lawsuits and court decisions directly affect New Jersey DWI cases, they might offer a guide to possible challenges to this state’s requirements.

Municipal court judges in New Jersey are required by law to order the installation of an IID in some DWI cases, and in all cases of refusal to submit to breath testing. An IID order is not mandatory for first-time DWI offenders whose BAC was less than 0.15 percent. If a judge decides to order IID installation under those circumstances, the order can be for a minimum of six months after the reinstatement of the defendant’s license, to a maximum of one year. The time period is the same for mandatory IID orders in refusal cases and first-time DWI cases with BAC of at least 0.15 percent. Second or subsequent convictions for DWI or refusal include mandatory IID installation for one to three years. Failure to install an IID when ordered to do so can result in further license suspension and other penalties.

The federal government encourages states to enact laws requiring the use of IIDs after DWI convictions. A law passed by Congress in 1998, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, reduces the amount of federal highway funds available to states that do not enact “repeat intoxicated driver laws.” This term is defined to include minimum license suspension periods and mandatory IID installation. The U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress may, within reasonable limits, attach conditions to federal funding provided to states in South Dakota v. Dole. State-level IID requirements have also faced various legal challenges.
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Courts in New Jersey encourage both prosecutors and defendants to explore alternatives to taking a case to trial. Most prosecutions in New Jersey do not go to trial, ending instead in a plea agreement, diversion, or dismissal. Defendants charged with criminal offenses may qualify for pretrial intervention (PTI), which allows them to “avoid ordinary prosecution by receiving early rehabilitative services or supervision.” Driving while intoxicated (DWI) is not a criminal offense under New Jersey law, meaning that PTI is not available for defendants charged with DWI in municipal court. The related offense of driving while license suspended (DWLS), however, can lead to criminal charges in certain situations. Information about PTI may therefore still be useful during a DWI case. A recent decision by the New Jersey Appellate Division, State v. Torres, reviews the criteria for PTI.

New Jersey law establishes PTI as a means of focusing on the “least burdensome form of prosecution possible” for qualifying defendants. Eligibility is generally limited to defendants with no prior convictions in New Jersey, nor in any other federal or state court. The statute does not define additional eligibility requirements, other than a presumption against eligibility for defendants charged with public corruption or domestic violence. Prosecutors may recommend a defendant for PTI based on various factors, including the severity of the alleged offense, the defendant’s age, and circumstances that suggest that ordinary prosecution would not be effective at deterring future illegal activity or serving justice.

The PTI statute can be found in Title 2C of the New Jersey Revised Statutes, also known as the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice. The DWI statute, on the other hand, is found in Title 39, Motor Vehicles and Traffic Regulation. This title deals with motor vehicle offenses like speeding, reckless driving, and DWLS, in addition to DWI. Proceedings involving motor vehicle offenses are similar to criminal proceedings in most ways. Prosecutors are still required to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, for example, but defendants charged with DWI are not entitled to a trial by jury. In certain situations, DWLS is covered by a criminal statute, such as when a person allegedly drives during a period of license suspension that resulted from a DWI conviction.

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Post-conviction relief (PCR) allows a defendant to challenge a conviction even after the time period to file an appeal has passed, provided they can assert certain grounds for doing so. Under New Jersey law, a PCR petition must allege a significant violation of a defendant’s legal or constitutional rights, rather than just an error by a lower court. If a defendant can establish a violation of their rights, the court may order a new trial, modify the sentence, or, if the defendant is incarcerated, order their release. A recent decision by the New Jersey Appellate Division, State v. Cooper, considered a claim for post-conviction review in a driving while intoxicated (DWI) case, based, in part, on a claim of insufficient evidence. Specifically, the defendant’s blood alcohol content (BAC) test results were below the legal limit, and the defendant argued that the remaining evidence did not support a finding of guilt.

New Jersey municipal courts have original jurisdiction over DWI cases, so that is where defendants must file petitions for PCR. Rule 7:10-2 of the New Jersey Rules of Court governs PCR procedures. It identifies several possible grounds for PCR, including any ground that could be raised to challenge a conviction “by habeas corpus or any other common law or statutory remedy.” This catch-all category covers a wide area of law. In Cooper, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence but did so by alleging that his counsel at trial was ineffective.

Prosecutors can offer evidence that a defendant operated a vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol in several ways. State law defines DWI to include driving with a BAC of 0.08 percent or higher, but the state can also use testimony by police officers who witnessed the defendant’s behavior during and after their arrest, and who have training in identifying signs of alcohol intoxication. Some New Jersey police departments also employ officers trained in recognizing the physical indicators of drug use. The reliability of such testimony, especially with regard to drugs, is often contested at trial.

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New Jersey law allows prosecutors to offer evidence of driving while intoxicated (DWI) in two ways. One way relies on evidence like testimony by police officers about outward signs of intoxication, including appearance and behavior. The second method involves evidence that a defendant’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was above a certain level. This is often known as “per se” DWI because the BAC evidence creates a presumption that the defendant was impaired by alcohol. A DWI defense strategy should take both methods of proving DWI into consideration. Defending against a per se DWI charge in New Jersey often involves challenging police equipment more than police witnesses. The Appellate Division recently considered an appeal of a per se DWI conviction in State v. Page.

The DWI statute defines the offense as driving either “while under the the influence” of alcohol or drugs or with a BAC of at least 0.08 percent. The latter definition constitutes per se DWI. It does not necessarily require any evidence other than the defendant’s actual or imminent operation of a motor vehicle and the defendant’s BAC at or near that time. It is possible to obtain an acquittal or dismissal in a DWI case even with evidence of a BAC over 0.08 percent. It is also possible, however, for the state to obtain a conviction without BAC evidence or with a BAC of less than 0.08 percent.

New Jersey courts have established a variety of procedures and protocols that police must follow in an effort to ensure the accuracy of BAC test results. Police in this state commonly use a device known as the Alcotest to measure BAC. The defendant must provide a breath sample by blowing into a tube. The device then measures the alcohol content of the sample. The Alcotest requires regular maintenance and careful calibration, and it can produce inaccurate results without either of these. A 2008 decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court, State v. Chun, establishes maintenance and record-keeping protocols that police must follow for Alcotest results to be admissible in court. It also requires police to observe a DWI suspect for 20 minutes before administering the test.

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Under New Jersey’s driving while intoxicated (DWI) statute, a defendant is presumed to be legally impaired by alcohol if their blood alcohol content (BAC) is 0.08 percent or higher. Police in New Jersey commonly use a device known as the Alcotest to collect breath samples, which the device analyzes to measure BAC. Police may also obtain blood or urine samples to test, but state law only requires drivers to submit breath samples in DWI investigations. Obtaining a sample of blood usually requires a warrant or the person’s consent. Determining whether a defendant gave proper consent to a warrantless blood draw is a key question courts must consider. The New Jersey Appellate Division ruled on this issue earlier this year in State v. Milkosky.

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires police to obtain a warrant before searching a person or their property. Drawing blood for use in a police investigation counts as a “search.” Courts have identified multiple exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The “exigent circumstances” exception applies when police and prosecutors can demonstrate that taking the time to get a warrant from a judge would result in greater harm than the warrantless search, such as the destruction of evidence, the escape of a suspect, or harm to an officer or others.

Police have, at times, claimed exigent circumstances to justify collecting blood samples from a DWI suspect without a warrant or the suspect’s consent. Alcohol breaks down in the human body due to the process of metabolism. In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the claim that the metabolism of alcohol in the body, by itself, satisfies the exigent circumstances exception. The decision, Missouri v. McNeely, established that a warrant or the suspect’s consent is required for most blood draws.

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Chemical testing for alcohol or drugs is a key component of most prosecutions for driving while intoxicated (DWI) in New Jersey. Breath testing is mandatory under state law, but the Alcotest and similar devices can only test for the presence of alcohol. If police suspect driving under the influence of drugs, New Jersey law provides no immediate means to obtain evidence. Drawing blood without a person’s consent requires a warrant in most circumstances. The New Jersey Appellate Division took up these issues in an appeal that challenged the admissibility of blood test results. Its ruling in State v. Nasta deals specifically with criminal charges, rather than DWI, but it is likely to affect New Jersey DWI cases in the future.

Since it involves an invasive procedure, courts have held that drawing blood as part of an investigation for DWI or another offense is a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This means that police must obtain a warrant from a judge by demonstrating that they have probable cause to believe that the search will reveal evidence of wrongdoing.

Police are not required to obtain a warrant in certain situations identified by courts as exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. One exception involves “exigent circumstances,” in which taking the time to obtain a warrant would risk greater harm than a warrantless search. The impending destruction or loss of evidence could constitute an exigent circumstance. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, ruled in Missouri v. McNeely that the natural breakdown of alcohol by the human body is not “exigent” enough to allow a warrantless blood draw. The court has not said that a warrantless blood draw is never justified by exigent circumstances, but it has not identified what those circumstances might be.

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