Articles Posted in Effect of Arrest or Conviction

A charge of alleged driving while intoxicated (DWI) in New Jersey requires a thorough and vigorous defense from the moment charges are filed. A recent decision from the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, State v. Haas, demonstrates that a court may not be able to reduce certain penalties prescribed by state law, regardless of the circumstances. The municipal court ordered that the defendant was subject to “house arrest” while his appeal of the merits of his conviction was pending in the Superior Court, Law Division. The Law Division, while denying his appeal, credited his 149 days of house arrest as “time served” towards the 180-day minimum sentence for a third or subsequent DWI offense. The state appealed this decision, and the Appellate Division ruled that a credit against the mandatory minimum sentence is not authorized under New Jersey law.

The municipal court convicted the defendant of his third DWI offense. For a third or subsequent DWI conviction, § 39:4-50(a)(3) of the New Jersey Revised Statutes imposes a sentence of “not less than 180 days in a county jail or workhouse,” with the possibility of reducing the total sentence by up to 90 days for participation in certain drug or alcohol treatment programs.

The defendant asked the municipal court to stay the sentence while he appealed the conviction to the Law Division. New Jersey Court Rule 7:13-2 allows a municipal court to stay all or part of a sentence “on such terms as the court deems appropriate.” The court ordered the defendant confined to his home during the appeal. He could only leave to see his counsel, his doctors, and, at the defendant’s request, for one three-hour visit per week with his adult daughter, for whom he provided care after she suffered a brain injury.

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A defendant appealed his conviction of driving while license suspended (DWLS) to the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, claiming that the trial court should not have counted DWI convictions from New York as prior convictions under New Jersey law. State criminal law treats DWLS as a criminal offense, not a traffic offense, when the suspension is due to prior DWI convictions. The appellate court affirmed the trial court in State v. Galdieri, finding that state law includes out-of-state convictions, even if a prior case included mistakes of law.

DWLS is normally a traffic offense under New Jersey law. It is a crime of the fourth degree, however, if the reason for the suspension is a second or subsequent conviction for DWI or refusal to submit to breath testing. According to the court, the defendant in Galdieri had two DWI convictions from the state of New York, although it does not say when these occurred. The defendant pleaded guilty to DWI in a New Jersey court in October 2012. The court suspended his license for three months, which is the penalty for a first DWI offense. This apparently happened because the judge was not aware of the New York cases. Twelve days later, the defendant was pulled over and charged with DWLS, which resulted in the present case.

The defendant pleaded guilty to criminal DWLS in June 2013, based on the prior DWI convictions. On appeal, the defendant apparently conceded that he had prior DWI convictions from the state of New York, but he claimed that they should not count towards enhancing the offense to the criminal level. He argued that the October 2012 DWI conviction in New Jersey should count as a first offense, since it was the only New Jersey conviction and the judge imposed the penalty for a first offense.

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New Jersey Governor Chris Christie rejected the Legislature’s effort to reform state law regarding penalties for driving while intoxicated (DWI) in a conditional veto issued in late March 2015. A “conditional veto” allows the Governor to object to a bill as passed, while presenting proposed revisions or a replacement. The Legislature may then decide whether or not to approve the Governor’s changes. The bill, passed by both houses of the Legislature, would substantially reduce mandatory license suspension periods while increasing requirements for ignition interlock devices (IIDs). The Governor’s primary objection was apparently to the repeal of mandatory license-suspension periods.

The bill, A1368, was first introduced in the Assembly in January 2014. The Assembly passed it in June 2014, followed by the Senate in February 2015. A substantial portion of the bill addresses license suspension and IID requirements. The New Jersey DWI statute currently requires, for first-time DWI offenders, a three-month license suspension if a person’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.08 percent or higher but less than 0.10 percent, or a license suspension of seven months to one year if their BAC was 0.10 percent or higher. For a second DWI offense, current law mandates a two-year license suspension, followed by required installation of an IID. A third or subsequent offense results in a mandatory 10-year suspension with an IID requirement.

Under the changes made by A1368, the mandatory license suspension period for almost all DWI offenses would be 10 days, during which time they would be required to have an IID installed in their vehicle as a condition of license reinstatement. The period of time a person would be required to continue using the IID roughly corresponds to the length of the mandatory license suspensions under the current statute. The bill generally gives judges discretion to impose different periods of license suspension or IID use, based on factors like risk to the public, the person’s driving record, length of time without traffic violations, and hardship to the person or the person’s dependents.

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A New Jersey appellate court recently considered the question of whether a defendant must inform the court of prior convictions that, under New Jersey law, could result in an enhanced sentence. In an unpublished February 2015 decision, State v. Kane, the court ruled that a defendant charged with driving while license suspended (DWLS) was not obligated to inform prosecutors or the court that the suspension was due to a driving while intoxicated (DWI) conviction. State motor vehicle and criminal statutes include enhanced penalties in certain DWLS cases where DWI was the reason for the suspension. The court rejected the state’s arguments that the defense’s failure to provide this information constituted fraud and a breach of attorney ethics rules.

The defendant was arrested in January 2012 in Ocean City for talking on a cell phone while driving. She was subject to a 10-year suspension of her driver’s license at the time, according to the court, because of multiple DWI convictions. She pleaded guilty to DWLS in municipal court that March. DWLS is normally a “non-indictable offense,” and the judge sentenced her to 30 days in jail, to be served intermittently.

New Jersey law prescribes enhanced penalties for a DWLS if the underlying reason for the license suspension is a DWI offense. About seven months before the defendant’s plea, in August 2011, a new criminal statute became effective that made the defendant’s DWLS offense an indictable offense, with substantially greater penalties. The statute allows prosecution of DWLS as a fourth-degree crime, as opposed to a traffic offense, if the license suspension was due to DWI, and the defendant has one or more prior DWLS convictions.
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New Jersey’s legal system has developed several methods to discourage people with convictions for driving while intoxicated (DWI) and related offenses from getting behind the wheel after drinking. Along with every other state and the District of Columbia, New Jersey requires the use of ignition interlock devices (IIDs) in certain situations. At least one state has gone much further in restricting people with convictions, or even just arrests, for DWI and other offenses. Utah’s “alcohol restricted driver” (ARD) law prohibits drivers from operating a vehicle with any alcohol in their system for periods ranging from two to ten years, with a lifetime ban in some circumstances.

In order to start a vehicle equipped with an IID, the person must blow into the device, which operates much like a breathalyzer or other breath-test machine. If the device determines that the driver’s blood alcohol content (BAC) is above a threshold amount, which is usually 0.05 percent in New Jersey, it prevents the vehicle from starting for a period of several hours. The “legal limit” for DWI is 0.08 percent.

New Jersey’s DWI statute makes installation of an IID mandatory for offenses involving a BAC result of 0.15 percent or higher, as well as first-offense convictions for refusal to submit to chemical testing. A judge has discretion to order an IID for lesser offenses. Driving with a BAC above the IID amount, but below the legal limit of 0.08 percent, is not automatically a violation under New Jersey law, but any attempt to circumvent the IID, including by driving someone else’s car after drinking, is considered a violation.
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Pending legislation in at least two states would restrict sales of alcohol to people convicted of DWI offenses. A bill in the New Mexico State House of Representatives would allow a court to include a prohibition on alcohol purchases in an order requiring use of an ignition interlock device (IID). A bill in the Oklahoma State Senate goes even farther, allowing a court to bar the purchase of alcohol by anyone convicted of DWI. Anyone providing alcohol to someone under such a restriction could face criminal liability. States have near-total control over the regulation of alcoholic beverages, and at least one state already has such a law on the books. Lawmakers and others have suggested similar legislation in Texas and Washington state, but New Jersey does not have a law allowing this sort of restriction.

The sale of alcoholic beverages was illegal throughout the United States during a period known as Prohibition, which began with the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1920. The Twenty-First Amendment, ratified in 1933, repealed the Eighteenth Amendment and left the regulation of alcoholic beverages up to the states. A series of Supreme Court decisions have explored the extent to which states may restrict the sale or purchase of alcohol. Alaska allows courts to order a person who has been convicted of DWI to “refrain from consuming alcoholic beverages,” and to prohibit him or her from purchasing alcohol. The state may issue a new driver’s license or other identification to a person subject to this restriction, which indicates the restriction.

New Mexico’s HB30 would amend the state’s IID law to allow a judge to prohibit a defendant from purchasing alcoholic beverages for as long as that individual is required to have an IID installed in his or her vehicle. Much like the Alaska law, the state would issue a new identification card indicating the alcohol restriction. The bill’s sponsor introduced it during the last legislative session in 2013. It passed the New Mexico House but failed to pass in the Senate. He introduced it again in December 2014. Continue reading

New Jersey law directs courts to apply sentencing enhancements for a second driving while intoxicated (DWI) conviction, with additional enhancements for third and subsequent convictions. In certain circumstances, however, trial courts may not use sentencing enhancements when the statute might otherwise require them to do so. A “step-down” provision in the DWI statute, for example, directs courts not to apply sentencing enhancements if enough time has passed since the most recent prior conviction. We recently represented a client who wanted to use the step-down provision, but the trial court would not allow it. It said that he was limited to one use of the step-down provision, and he had already used it once before. The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in our client’s favor, finding that the DWI statute allows use of the step-down provision more than once.

The step-down provision, found in the last paragraph of Section 39:4-50(a)(3) of the New Jersey Revised Statutes, states that if a person’s second DWI offense occurs more than 10 years after the first offense, the court must treat the second offense as a first offense during sentencing. If a third offense occurs more than 10 years after the second offense, the court must use the sentencing guidelines for a second offense. A 1990 decision from the New Jersey Supreme Court, State v. Laurick, sets another important limit on a court’s sentencing authority. A court may not use a prior DWI conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction if the defendant was not represented by counsel in the prior case.

The defendant in our case had prior DWI convictions from 1981, 1982, and 1994. The trial court applied second-offense sentencing enhancements in the 1994 case, since, while it was technically the third offense, it occurred more than 10 years after the most recent prior offense. Here is where the case can get confusing. The defendant was not represented by an attorney in the 1982 case, so the trial court should not have considered it during sentencing. An appellate court reduced his sentence for the 1994 offense to first-offense levels. Continue reading

An arrest for alleged driving while intoxicated (DWI) in New Jersey has serious consequences, even before charges are filed or the case goes to trial. A driver could face license suspension and other administrative penalties that are largely separate from the court procedures for a DWI case. He or she also may face a charge of refusal to submit to chemical testing, and in some cases courts have held that simply not blowing hard enough into a breathalyzer machine could support a refusal conviction. Certain other criminal charges are common in alleged DWI cases, some of which could significantly increase the penalties that a prosecutor might seek in court.

Other Traffic Charges

Many, possibly most, DWI cases begin when a police officer pulls a driver over. An officer must have reasonable suspicion that a traffic offense has occurred for any evidence collected during the traffic stop to be admissible in court. If the officer can prove that he or she witnessed the driver violate a traffic law, such as by speeding, running a red light, or changing lanes without signaling, the stop is probably supported by reasonable suspicion. An officer also may pull over a car if it appeared that the driver was impaired based on how he or she was driving. Once the stop is underway, other evidence, like the “smell of alcohol” so often cited in court, may support a DWI charge.

Since a DWI arrest often originates with another alleged traffic violation, it stands to reason that DWI cases often involve other traffic charges. Many of these are minor offenses, like failing to use a turn signal or avoiding a traffic light, while others, such as driving with a suspended license, are relatively more serious. Even if a driver can prove that he or she was not drinking, he or she could face charges for careless or reckless driving. Continue reading

A bill that was recently approved by the New Jersey State Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee (NJSBA) would change the requirements for ignition interlock devices (IIDs) in driving while intoxicated (DWI) cases. Under current New Jersey DWI law, an IID is only mandatory for second or subsequent convictions, or in cases where chemical testing shows a sufficiently high blood alcohol content (BAC). The proposed bill would make IIDs mandatory in all DWI cases across the state. The New Jersey Assembly passed a companion bill in June 2014. A previous version of the bill was passed by the state Senate, but not the Assembly, in 2013.

State law defines an IID as a device that “permit[s] a motor vehicle to be started only when the driver is sober.” The device must be installed on the dashboard of a DWI defendant’s vehicle. Prior to starting the vehicle, the driver must blow into the device, much like with an Alcotest machine or other breathalyzer. The device analyzes the breath sample and, if the BAC is reading is greater than the pre-programmed maximum, it prevents the vehicle’s ignition switch from sending a signal to the starter. In short, the driver may turn the key, but the car won’t start.

If the IID prevents operation of the vehicle, it may continue to do so for some programmed period of time to allow the driver to sober up. The accuracy and reliability of breathalyzer devices is a common issue in DWI cases, and IIDs can present similar problems. State law requires the Motor Vehicle Commission to certify IIDs and maintain a list of approved providers, but the devices require regular maintenance in order to function correctly. Continue reading

The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court ruled in State v. Lawrence that a defendant should not have received an enhanced sentence for driving while intoxicated (DWI), even though he had two prior convictions. New Jersey law increases the penalties for second, third, and subsequent DWI convictions, but there are exceptions. The defendant relied on two facts in support of his argument against enhanced penalties. He was not represented by counsel during his first DWI case, and both his first and second DWI cases occurred more than 10 years before the current case. The Appellate Division found that, under a New Jersey statute and a New Jersey Supreme Court decision, these facts required the trial court to sentence the defendant as a first offender.

The defendant pleaded guilty to DWI before a municipal judge, after he admitted to drinking “two alcoholic beverages and two beers” before driving. The defendant had two prior DWI convictions from 1990 and 1994. Although this was his third offense, the judge sentenced him as a second offender on August 30, 2012.

New Jersey’s DWI statute imposes enhanced penalties for a second, third, and subsequent convictions. It makes exceptions, however, if enough time passes between convictions. The DWI statute, in § 39:4-50(a)(3), states that if the third offense takes place more than 10 years after the second offense, the court shall treat the third conviction as a second offense for sentencing purposes. Since about 18 years elapsed between the defendant’s second and third offenses, the court applied the sentencing guidelines for a second offense. Continue reading

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