Articles Posted in Defending the Case

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The act of flashing one’s headlights or high beams at another driver can have many different meanings, one of which is to warn that a speed trap is ahead. Some states have enacted laws prohibiting this practice, ostensibly for public safety. New Jersey’s statute, for example, prohibits flashing headlights that are “projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver.” These laws tend to discourage communication among drivers about speed traps, and they give police a reason to pull people over. These two purposes came into direct conflict in a recent DWI case in New Mexico. A woman successfully argued that flashing her high beams at an oncoming car, which turned out to be a police vehicle, was protected free speech, and that the officer therefore lacked probable cause to pull her over.

The New Mexico woman was pulled over at around 10:00 p.m. on January 25, 2014. She stated that she thought the oncoming car had its high beams on, so she quickly flashed her high beams back and honked her car horn. The other car turned around, activated its emergency lights, and pulled her over. She was charged with violating a high-beam ordinance as well as aggravated DWI. The judge granted her motion to suppress evidence of her field sobriety test and chemical test results, finding that she had engaged in speech protected by the First Amendment. This resulted in the dismissal of the entire case. She has also filed a lawsuit against the city and the officer for civil rights violations.

Drivers in several states have successfully challenged high-beam citations on free-speech grounds. A federal judge in Missouri granted a permanent injunction in April 2014 that prohibited the town of Ellisville from enforcing a law against flashing headlights to warn of speed traps, finding that the plaintiff was likely to prevail on his free speech claims. An Oregon judge ruled that high-beam charges violated a driver’s free-speech rights under the state constitution, and a Florida judge issued a similar ruling in May 2012 applying the U.S. Constitution. Continue reading

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The arrest of a man found sleeping in his car on a New Jersey road for alleged driving while intoxicated (DWI) raises a rather obvious question:  can police arrest someone for DWI if they did not actually see the person driving? New Jersey’s DWI statute, which prohibits “operat[ing] a vehicle” while intoxicated or under the influence of illegal drugs, does not actually require an arresting officer, or anyone else, to witness a suspect driving. It does, however, require other evidence to establish that a person had been driving, or that he or she intended to drive and was about to do so, while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

Police in North Plainfield, New Jersey reportedly responded to a report of someone sleeping in his car early one morning in late September 2014. Officers found the car parked on the side of a road. They claimed that they had to shout to wake the man up, and that he told them he thought he was in a parking lot. Two children were also reportedly in the car with the man. His blood alcohol content (BAC) was allegedly 0.13 percent, which resulted in charges of both DWI and child endangerment. The latter charge depends on the state’s ability to prove the former. Since no witnesses have claimed to have seen the man driving, this will depend on whether the state can prove beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the circumstances, that the man had operated the vehicle.

Mr. Uquillas-Tapia has several defenses to this situation.

Continue reading

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Police patrol cars in New Jersey must be equipped with video cameras under a new law passed by the New Jersey Legislature and signed by the Governor in September 2014. The law takes effect during a time when police accountability is a topic of national interest. Video cameras, either worn by the police officer or mounted in the police vehicle, are often proposed as a means of curbing civil rights abuses. The original sponsor of the bill, Assemblyman Paul Moriarty, was the subject of a traffic stop and an arrest for alleged DWI in 2012. Video footage from a camera in the officer’s car differed significantly from the officer’s report of the stop and ultimately exonerated Moriarty.

Moriarty was arrested on July 31, 2012 in Washington Township, New Jersey after a traffic stop. The officer who pulled Moriarty over claimed that Moriarty cut him off after making an illegal lane change. Moriarty refused to submit to a breath test, resulting in a criminal charge of refusal as well as DWI. Video of the stop, taken from a dashboard camera in the officer’s vehicle, reportedly contradicted the officer’s account of the stop. The prosecutor dismissed the charges against Moriarty in May 2013 after concluding that evidence obtained from the stop would be inadmissible.

The officer faced multiple criminal charges in the aftermath of the arrest, including perjury, official misconduct, and tampering with public records. Moriarty filed at least two civil suits in connection with the incident: a defamation suit against a car dealership for allegedly false statements by employees that led to the traffic stop, and a civil rights claim against the police department and the arresting officer. Being a New Jersey Assemblyman, Moriarty also took steps to make the type of evidence that exonerated him available to every DWI defendant. Continue reading

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The criminal offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI) is most often associated with alcohol, hence the term “drunk driving.” It is also an offense under New Jersey’s DWI statute to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of certain other drugs. While the statute determines the severity of a DWI offense involving alcohol based on several levels of blood alcohol content (BAC), it provides no similar guidance for other drugs. Courts have generally held that expert testimony is required to prove intoxication by certain types of drugs.

New Jersey’s DWI statute defines the offense, in part, as driving “while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic, or habit-producing drug,” or with a BAC of 0.08% or higher. The statute creates two tiers of alcohol intoxication for first offenders. The first tier includes people with a BAC of at least 0.08 percent but less than 0.10 percent, and the second tier includes people with a BAC of 0.10 percent or higher. The second tier also includes anyone under the influence of a “narcotic, hallucinogenic, or habit-producing drug,” regardless of the amount.

Breath tests are not effective at measuring the amount of drugs, as covered by the DWI statute, in a person’s blood stream. Police generally rely on blood or urine tests. Under New Jersey’s implied consent statute, anyone who drives on a public street or road within the state consents to giving samples of breath, blood, or urine for the purposes of enforcing the DWI statute. New Jersey courts have held that chemical test results, expert testimony, and layperson testimony are all relevant to the question of whether a person is “intoxicated” due to drugs. Continue reading

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The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court ruled in State v. Lawrence that a defendant should not have received an enhanced sentence for driving while intoxicated (DWI), even though he had two prior convictions. New Jersey law increases the penalties for second, third, and subsequent DWI convictions, but there are exceptions. The defendant relied on two facts in support of his argument against enhanced penalties. He was not represented by counsel during his first DWI case, and both his first and second DWI cases occurred more than 10 years before the current case. The Appellate Division found that, under a New Jersey statute and a New Jersey Supreme Court decision, these facts required the trial court to sentence the defendant as a first offender.

The defendant pleaded guilty to DWI before a municipal judge, after he admitted to drinking “two alcoholic beverages and two beers” before driving. The defendant had two prior DWI convictions from 1990 and 1994. Although this was his third offense, the judge sentenced him as a second offender on August 30, 2012.

New Jersey’s DWI statute imposes enhanced penalties for a second, third, and subsequent convictions. It makes exceptions, however, if enough time passes between convictions. The DWI statute, in § 39:4-50(a)(3), states that if the third offense takes place more than 10 years after the second offense, the court shall treat the third conviction as a second offense for sentencing purposes. Since about 18 years elapsed between the defendant’s second and third offenses, the court applied the sentencing guidelines for a second offense. Continue reading

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New Jersey law deals very seriously with the traffic offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI). An arrest for DWI can result in a license suspension, if the State can prove the offense in court beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a person does not even need to be driving a vehicle, nor do they need to be intoxicated, to be charged with DWI under New Jersey law. The traffic offense of DWI also includes permitting another person to operate a vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The New Jersey Supreme Court has considered cases involving this part of the statute several times and has consistently held that it is a key component of the state’s objective of preventing and punishing drunk driving.

Under New Jersey law, the offense of DWI is defined primarily as “operat[ing] a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or…with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more.” The statute also includes “permit[ting] another person [who meets the above definition] to operate a motor vehicle.” The New Jersey Supreme Court discussed this part of the statute in State v. Hessen in 1996, noting that “a person who allows an intoxicated person to drive” is “as blameworthy as the drunk driver.” State v. Kashi held that the “permitting” portion of the statute is not a separate offense from DWI, but rather an “alternative evidential method” of proving the offense of DWI.

Civil liability for damages caused by a drunk driver are fairly well-known, such as if a social host or bar serves alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed this view in the 1984 case Kelly v. Gwinnell. Imposing quasi-criminal liability, however, requires a higher standard of proof than in a civil case. The statute does not make it clear what constitutes “permitting” an intoxicated person to operate a vehicle. In theory, anyone who comes into contact with an intoxicated person could inquire as to whether they intend to drive, but it would be unwieldy and unreasonably to impose quasi-criminal liability on all of those people. Several New Jersey courts have addressed the elements that a prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Continue reading

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A decision issued by the U.S. Supreme Court last year limits the ability of police to take a blood sample from a DWI suspect without consent or a warrant. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013). The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures, and generally requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant before searching private property. Police can claim “exigent circumstances” to justify a warrantless search, meaning that in a specific emergency situation, they cannot take the time to obtain a warrant. The McNeely case addressed claims by police that the human body’s process of metabolizing alcohol was an exigent circumstance that justified taking a blood sample without a warrant. In response to the decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court has modified its procedures for search warrant requests to ensure that judges are available to issue warrants.

The defendant in McNeely was stopped by a highway patrolman for speeding. The officer claims that defendant did not perform well in a field sobriety test, and he refused a breath test. En route to the police station, the defendant refused a breath test again, so the officer diverted to a hospital and directed a hospital technician to take a blood sample. The defendant did not consent to having blood drawn, and the officer did not obtain a warrant. Lab testing showed blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.154 percent, almost twice the legal limit of 0.08 percent.

The state charged the defendant with driving while intoxicated, but the court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. It held that the warrantless blood test violated his Fourth Amendment rights. When the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the decision, the U.S. Supreme Court took the case in order to resolve a conflict with its own prior decision in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). That case held that an officer might reasonably conclude that the breakdown of alcohol in the bloodstream constituted “exigent circumstances,” id. at 770-71, but limited its holding to the specific circumstances of the case. In McNeely, the court rejected establishing a “per se rule” that alcohol metabolism justifies a warrantless blood test. 133 S.Ct. at 1561. Continue reading

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The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division considered the appeal of a DWI defendant in State v. Lobo that challenged the admissibility of Alcotest results. The defendant argued in part that the state’s failure to provide him with complete repair and maintenance records for the device used to test his blood alcohol content (BAC) entitled him to relief on appeal. The state’s case relied on results from an Alcotest device, which has been sufficiently controversial that the state plans on retiring it. The court rejected each of the defendant’s points of error and affirmed the conviction.

The defendant was arrested on April 29, 2011 after a traffic stop. At a State Police barracks, officers administered a breath test using a Dräger Alcotest 7110 MK III-C device. The test showed a BAC of 0.13 percent, and the defendant was charged with DWI. The court ordered the state to produce repair records and other information regarding the Alcotest device. Prosecutors later informed the court that some repair records were not available, leading the court to modify its order to require production of “repair records that exist.”

Based on the information obtained about the device, the defendant moved to dismiss the case or exclude the Alcotest results on multiple grounds. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, which allowed him to preserve the issues raised in his motion to dismiss for appeal. Continue reading

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A series of errors by a private laboratory testing company has called hundreds of pending DWI cases into question. Blood samples sent to the lab were reportedly mislabeled, or were subject to other paperwork errors, resulting in uncertain test results. Prosecutors are trying to determine whether retesting is possible, while DWI defendants and their advocates remain skeptical that the state has revealed all of the damage done by the lab’s errors. Laws defining the offense of DWI generally do not require evidence of blood alcohol content (BAC) obtained through blood or breath testing, but chemical evidence is generally considered the simplest way for prosecutors to prove intoxication.

The district attorney’s office in San Antonio, Texas contracted with the laboratory, which is located in the Dallas/Fort Worth area, to test samples taken by police in DWI cases. The lab reportedly sent a letter to the DA’s office in May 2014 informing it that an analyst had made multiple errors in paperwork affecting hundreds of samples. The DA’s office has reportedly not made the full extent of the errors public, but one error by the analyst, who has been terminated by the lab, involved incorrect labeling of 350 samples.

The lab has reportedly sent test results to the DA’s office with notices that they cannot definitively link the results to a specific sample, although the DA’s office has denied that results have actually been mixed up between cases. The office has also denied that any samples were contaminated by the lab, although news media have reported that some documents make reference to contaminated equipment. The situation has left both prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys uncertain how to proceed with pending DWI cases. Continue reading

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The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial. If this right is denied, the court may dismiss the charges. The New Jersey Supreme Court considered this issue in New Jersey v. Cahill, ruling in early April 2013 that a sixteen-month wait for a DWI trial in municipal court denied the defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Applying a four-part test developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1972 in Barker v. Wingo, the court affirmed the dismissal of the DWI charge.

The defendant was ticketed on October 27, 2007 for driving while intoxicated and other motor vehicle charges. Six months later, on April 10, 2008, a grand jury indicted him for fourth-degree assault by auto. The defendant pleaded guilty to the assault by auto charge in Camden County Superior Court on September 19, 2008. A judge sentenced him to one year of probation, plus fines and other penalties, on November 14, 2008.

That same day, the Camden County prosecutor sent written notice to the Pennsauken Municipal Court administrator that the Superior Court was remanding the October 2007 motor vehicle tickets to the municipal court, and that the defendant had waived double jeopardy. The municipal court notified the defendant in March 2010 that it had set the DWI and other motor vehicle charges for trial on April 12, 2010. This date was sixteen months after notice of remand was sent to the municipal court, and almost twenty-nine months after the date of the tickets. Continue reading

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